







            
          
        
            
       
  
   
   
    
    
  
    
    
   
  
Security Improvement for Energy 
Harvesting based Overlay Cognitive 
Networks with Jamming-Assisted 
Full-Duplex Destinations 
Ho-Van, K., Sofotasios, P., Muhaidat, S., Cotton, S., Yoo, S., 
Brychkov, Y. A., Dobre, O. A. & Valkama, M 
Author post-print (accepted) deposited by Coventry University’s Repository
Original citation & hyperlink:
Ho-Van, K, Sofotasios, P, Muhaidat, S, Cotton, S, Yoo, S, Brychkov, YA, Dobre, OA & 
Valkama, M 2021, 'Security Improvement for Energy Harvesting based Overlay 
Cognitive Networks with Jamming-Assisted Full-Duplex Destinations', IEEE 






© 2021 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must
be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including
reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes,
creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or
reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright 
owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively
from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The
content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
This document is the author’s post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during
the peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version
may remain and you are advised to consult the published version if you wish to cite from
it.
1 
Security Improvement for Energy Harvesting based 
Overlay Cognitive Networks with Jamming-Assisted 
Full-Duplex Destinations 
Khuong Ho-Van, Paschalis C. Sofotasios, Senior Member, IEEE, Sami Muhaidat, Senior Member, IEEE, 
Simon L. Cotton, Senior Member, IEEE, Seong Ki Yoo, Senior Member, IEEE, Yury A. Brychkov, 
Octavia A. Dobre, Fellow, IEEE, and Mikko Valkama, Senior Member, IEEE 
Abstract—This work investigates the secrecy capability of 
energy harvesting based overlay cognitive networks (EHOCNs). 
To this end, we assume that a message by a licensed transmitter 
is relayed by an unlicensed sender. Critically, the unlicensed 
sender uses energy harvested from licensed signals, enhancing the 
overall energy effciency and maintaining the integrity of licensed 
communications. To secure messages broadcast by the unlicensed 
sender against the wire-tapper, full-duplex destinations – unli-
censed recipient and licensed receiver – jam the eavesdropper at 
the same time they receive signals from the unlicensed sender. To 
this effect, we derive closed-form formulas for the secrecy outage 
probability, which then quantify the security performance of 
both unlicensed and licensed communications for EHOCNs with 
jamming-assisted full-duplex destinations, namely EHOCNwFD. 
In addition, optimum operating parameters are established, 
which can serve as essential design guidelines of such systems. 
Index Terms—Energy harvesting, full-duplex jamming, overlay 
cognitive radio, PHY layer security, secrecy probability. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive radio technology (CRT) permits unlicensed users 
(UUs) to operate in licensed frequency bands (LFBs) of 
licensed users (LUs) via three popular principles: underlay, 
interweave, and overlay [1]. The underlay principle offers 
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UUs access permission to LFBs, whenever UUs guarantee that 
generated interference by them is below an acceptable level for 
LUs. In the interweave principle, UUs merely access unused 
frequencies of LUs, whereas in the overlay principle UUs are 
allowed to share concurrently LFBs with LUs. The latter is 
achieved using sophisticated signal processing methods, which 
ultimately enhance the overall performance of CRT. 
Radio frequency (RF) energy harvesting (EH) exploits avail-
able energy resources to power wireless terminals, leading to 
an overall improved energy effciency [2]. Yet, legal messages 
in practical communications can be overheard, particularly in 
CRT where wire-tappers can emulate UUs to access LFBs. 
Owing to this, recent methods such as physical layer security 
(PLS) have emerged as effcacious solutions to enhance se-
curity in wireless networks [3]. Among various PLS methods, 
jamming exhibits distinct capabilities of security improvement, 
without additional complexity [4]. This, along with CRT and 
RF EH, can assist in addressing the challenges of emerging 
technologies, such as increased number of wireless services 
for a massive number of users, effcient spectrum utilization, 
high energy effciency, and enhanced security [5]. 
Several contributions investigated message security for in-
terweave/underlay cognitive networks with EH and jamming; 
yet, only few have concentrated on the overlay ones [6]– 
[17]. Specifcally, [6] and [7] investigated the scenario in 
Fig. 1, where the unlicensed sender S scavenges energy in 
licensed signals for powering its two concurrent activities: 
send its own message and relay the licensed message. Also, in 
order to restrict overhearing of the wire-tapper W, the licensed 
receiver R was assumed to send jamming signals towards 
W. Different from [6] and [7] where R served as jammer, 
[8]–[10] proposed a conscientious jammer J. Nonetheless, J 
in [8] and [9] must scavenge RF energy from the licensed 
transmitter P while J in [10] was an RF energy supplier for 
S. To further secure messages in [6]–[10], [11] exploited both 
R and J to interrupt W, and only S is able to scavenge the 
RF energy. As an alternative solution to secure EHOCNs with 
multiple unlicensed sender-recipient pairs and various wire-
tappers, [12] considered the joint transmit antenna selection 
and multiuser scheduling method. However, the considered 
jammers in [6]–[11] and unlicensed senders in [12] were 
assumed to operate in half-duplex (HD) mode, which is less 
effcient than full-duplex (FD) mode [13]–[17]. In [13]–[15], 
S exploited the FD mode for improved spectral effciency. 
2 
Yet, even though [13]–[15] carried out an outage probability 
analysis, the issue on the message security was bypassed there. 
In [16] and [17], S assists and secures effectively the FD 
based licensed communication, which receives P’s message 
and jams W simultaneously. Nonetheless, [16] and [17] did not 
exploit EH for energy effciency improvement. Moreover, no 
security analyses in terms of the corresponding secrecy outage 
probability (SOP) were carried out in [6]–[17], neither for 
licensed nor for unlicensed communications in EHOCNwFD. 
Motivated by the above observations, this work analyzes 
EHOCNwFD in which P and R cannot achieve direct commu-
nications. Also, S sends its own message and assists licensed 
communications in exchange for access to LFBs. In this 
context, jamming-assisted FD destinations (R and unlicensed 
recipient D) are exploited to protect messages transmitted by 
S against W through the creation of jamming signals. Also, 
S is assumed to self-power its operation by extracting energy 
from licensed signals. Relied on this, closed-form formulas 
for the corresponding SOPs are derived for the scenario of 
both unlicensed and licensed communications. To this end, 
a creative signal generator is assumed for S, which either 
sends an unlicensed message in the last two phases, or relays a 
licensed message in Phase 2 and transmits its message in Phase 
3, subject to successful recovery of the licensed message. 
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
A. Channel Model 
In Fig. 1, hmn and dmn denote the channel coeffcient and 
the distance between the corresponding transmitter-receiver 
pair, respectively, where m ∈ {p, s, d, r} and n ∈ {s, d, r, w}. 
Because R and D are FD destinations, they receive signals 
from S at the same time they transmit jamming signals to W. 
Due to imperfect self-interference (SI) cancellation of the FD 
operation at R and D, residual SIs at R and D are represented 
through loop channels with channel coeffcients hrr and hdd, 
respectively. Notably, for effective wireless power transfer 
(WPT), the presence of a line-of-sight component is typically 
necessary. But since only Phase 1 performs WPT, hps is 
assumed to follow Rician distribution while other channel 
coeffcients are Rayleigh-distributed. Such an assumption is 
valid in scenarios where P is placed high above the ground, 
while other users are located on the ground. n o 
2Based on the above, we also let αmn = E |hmn| represent 
the fading power, where E{·} denotes statistical expectation. 
To this effect, we can model αmn = ς0(dmn/d0)
−β , where 
d0 = 1 meter (m) is the reference distance, β is the exponent 
decay, and ς0 is the fading power at d0 [15]. For Rayleigh 
fading, the channel coeffcient is indicated by a zero-mean 
circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variable, namely 
hmn ∼ CN (0, αmn). Then, the cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) and the probability density function (PDF) of the 
2 −z/αmnchannel gain gmn = |hmn| are: Fgmn (z) = 1 − e and 
−z/αmn /αmnfgmn (z) = e , respectively, which hold for z ≥ 0. 
B. Network Model 
Fig. 1 illustrates that message transmissions from P and S 


















P sends its message
S harvests energy
S decodes P’s message
S relays P’s message
S sends its message
R and D jam W








Fig. 1: System model. 
denoted as ϕ. In Phase 1 of δϕ, where 0 < δ < 1 indicates the 
time-split factor, P sends the symbol xp with the transmission 
power Pp for S to collect energy with the power splitting 
protocol1 and to restore the message of P. The power splitting 
protocol splits the signal received at S into two portions: one √
portion ηys, 0 < η < 1, indicates the power-split factor and 
ys is the signal received at S, for harvesting energy and another √ 
portion 1 − ηys for restoring the message of P. Depending 
on the recovery status, S sends dissimilar signals in following 
phases. Specifcally, when S restores the licensed messagep
successfully, it relays it in Phase 2, i.e., it sends P̂sxp, and p
transmits its personal signal, namely P̌sxs in Phase 3. Here, 
xs is the transmit symbol of S, whereas P̂s and P̌s denote the 
transmission powers of S in Phase 2 and Phase 3. 
In the scenario that the unlicensed sender fails to restore 
the licensed message, it instead broadcasts its personal signal√ 
Psxs where Ps is the transmission power of S in the last 
two phases. As illustrated in Fig. 1, R and D concurrently√ √ 
transmit the signals, Prxr and Pdxd, respectively, in both 
last phases to jam W, where Pr (or Pd) and xr (or xd) are 
the transmission power and the transmit symbol of R (or D), 
respectively. It is noted that R and D also suffer from SIs due 
to the FD operation, whilst three phases are required to avoid 
mutual interference between xs and xp. 
C. Signal Model 
Based on the considered set up, S receives ys = p
hps Ppxp + ns in Phase 1, where ns ∼ CN (0, s) is the 
noise caused by the receive antenna at S. Thus, the harvested2 
1RF EH can be implemented through either time switching (TS) or power 
splitting (PS) protocols [14]. On the one hand, TS is considered more energy-
effcient, yet it achieves a lower throughput. On the other hand, PS appears 
to be more complicated in terms of implementation, yet it exhibits higher 
achievable throughput. Based on the latter characteristic, the considered set 
up is based on the adoption of the PS protocol [6]–[8], [10]–[12], [14]. 
2Similar to the vast majority of reported publications (e.g., [2], [5]–[9], 
[11], [12], [18]), the present analysis considers the linear energy harvesting 
model, which still represents the non-linear model over a large range of the 
input RF power [18]. Therefore, the non-linear energy harvesting model (e.g., 
[10], [13]–[15], [19]) may not add signifcant further insights; hence, we defer 
it to our future works where the achieved performance of the linear energy 




n√ 2 o energy by S in Phase 1 is Es = θE ηys δϕ = 
δθη (Ppαps + s)ϕ, where 0 < θ < 1 is the energy har-
vesting effciency. Therefore, the powers which S can con-
sume in Phase 2, in Phase 3, and in both last phases are 
ˆ Es δθη(Ppαps +s) ˇ EsPs = = , Ps = = τ (1−δ)ϕ τ (1−δ) (1−τ )(1−δ)ϕ 
δθη(Ppαps+s) Es δθη(Ppαps+s ) , and Ps = = , respec-(1−τ)(1−δ) (1−δ)ϕ 1−δ √ 
tively. Also, the message decoder is based on y̌s = 1 − ηys+ 
ňs to recover P’s message, where ňs ∼ CN (0, ̌s) indicates 
the noise owing to down-converting the signal from the 
passband to the baseband. To this end, by invoking ys in y̌s,p √ 
one achieves y̌s = (1 − η) Pphpsxp + 1 − ηns + ňs which 
establishes the achievable Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) for 
(1−η)Ppdecoding P’s information as γs = Agps with A = .(1−η)s+̌s 
Thus, S achieves the channel capacity Cs = δlog2(1 + γs) 
bps/Hz, where δ is present because of δϕ in Phase 1. Also, S 
recovers successfully the licensed message only if Cs exceeds 
the target transmission rate RT, i.e., Cs ≥ RT. 
If S decodes the message of P successfully, it then sendsp p
P̂sxp in Phase 2 and P̌sxs in Phase 3. Otherwise, it√ 
transmits Psxs in both last phases. Furthermore, it is noted√ √ 
that R and D always broadcast Prxr and Pdxd in Phase t, 
t ∈ {2, 3}. Consequently, the signal received at L ∈ {D, W, R}
in Phase t is represented as 
 √ √ √ 
t hsl Ptxt +hrl Prxr +hdl Pdxd +nl , Cs ≥RT√ √ √yl = hsl Psxs +hrl Prxr +hdl Pdxd +nl , Cs <RT 
(1) 
where P2 = P̂s, P3 = P̌s, x2 =xp, x3 =xs, and nl ∼CN (0, l) 
indicates the noise due to the receive antenna at L. 
Usually, the jamming signals, xr and xd, are purposely 
generated by R and D to impair the wire-tapping of W without 
intercepting each other. For example, xr and xd are pseudo-
random signals [10] and the jamming signal generator at R 
encrypts its seed with a short secret key and shares it with 
D and vice versa. Consequently, most reported analyses (e.g., 
[6]–[11]) assumed that xr and xd were totally eliminated at 
D and R, respectively. Nevertheless, this assumption seems 
ideal because any regeneration of xr and xd is hardly achieved 
with absolute probability. Therefore, the analysis in the present 
paper assumes them regenerated at D and R with accuracy 
of 1 − κ, 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1, which indicates that κxd and 
κxr represent the residual jamming signals due to imperfect 
jamming cancellation at R and D, respectively. Accordingly, 
K ∈ {R, D} in Phase t obtains the signal with lower jamming 
after partly removing the corresponding jamming signal as 
 √ √ 
t hsk Ptxt +hkk Pkxk +κhjk Pj xj +nk , Cs≥RT y̌k = √ √ 
pp
hsk Psxs +hkk Pkxk +κhjk Pj xj +nk, Cs<RT 
(2) 
where (k, j) = {(r, d) , (d, r)}. As a result, the achievable 
channel capacities for D and R for recovering xs and xp are 
given by 
⎧   
ˇ⎨ Psgsd(1 − τ )(1 − δ) log2 1 + U+d , Cs ≥ RT Cd =   (3)⎩ (1 − δ) log2 1 + Psgsd , Cs < RTU +d 
and (   
P̂sgsrτ (1 − δ) log2 1 + Q+r , Cs ≥ RTCr = (4) 
0 , Cs < RT 
where (τ (1 − δ), (1 − τ )(1 − δ), 1 − δ) denote the durations 
of Phase 2, Phase 3, and both last phases, respectively; Q = 
Prgrr + κ2Pdgdr and U = Pdgdd + κ2Prgrd. 
The knowledge of the jamming signals, xr and xd, is merely 
shared between D and R for protecting xp and xs, whilst W is 
unknown with respect to (w.r.t) it. Thus, the channel capacities 
attained by W for restoring xp and xs follow from (1), yielding (   
P̂sgswτ (1 − δ) log2 1 + , Cs ≥ RTCp = W +w (5)w 
0 , Cs < RT 
and ⎧   ⎨ P̌s gsw(1 − τ) (1 − δ) log2 1 + , Cs ≥ RTW +wCs =   (6)w ⎩ (1 − δ) log2 1 + Psgsw , Cs < RTW +w 
where W = Prgrw + Pdgdw. It is evident that R and D 
purposely produce the amount of jamming power W to corrupt 
the wire-tapper. Therefore, enlarging W can enhance the 
overall security performance of both unlicensed and licensed 
communications. Furthermore, it is noted that the secrecy 
capacity for restoring xs represents the subtraction of the 
+capacity at W from that at D, namely Čs = [Cd − Cs ] ,w
+where [z] = max (z, 0). Likewise, the secrecy capacity for 
decoding xp indicates the subtraction of the capacity at W from 
− Cp +that at R, namely Čp = [Cr ] .w
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
One of the key indicators to evaluate the security of EHOC-
NwFD is the achievable SOP, which quantifes the probability 
of the secrecy capacity subceeding the target security degree 
CT. In the sequel, we derive exact closed-form SOP formulas 
to straightforwardly determine the achievable security levels 
for both unlicensed and licensed communications. 
A. Licensed SOP  
The licensed SOP is defned as Φp = Pr Čp < CT 
which is decomposed into two cases, depending on whether S 
decodes successfully the message of P or not, namely   
ˇΦp = Pr Cp < CT Cs ≥ RT Pr{Cs ≥ RT}  
ˇ+ Pr Cp < CT Cs < RT Pr{Cs < RT} (7) 
= ΛΞ + χ (1 − Ξ) . 
Based on the form of (7), it readily follows that h i  
2RT/δ −1Ξ=Pr{δlog2(1+Agps)≥ RT}=1−Fgps /A �  ∞ l nXX Kl 2RT/δ − 1 (8)[1 + K] / [αpsA] 
= 
(1+K)(2RT /δ −1)/(αpsA)+K e l!n! 
where Fgps (x) is the CDF of the P → S Rician fading channel 
gain, which is given in [20, eq. (9)]. Also, K is the Rician 
factor. As noted in [20], the infnite summation in (8) quickly 







Using (4) and (5) for the case Cs < RT, it follows that x−1 1where {b} = + .c P̂s αsr {Pd κ2αdr }Pr αrrχ = Pr{0 < CT} = 1 (9) To this effect, substituting (15) and (16) in (10) and since 
B−1 < 1 and FX (x) = 0 for x < 1, yieldsbecause the target security degree CT is non-negative. Simi-
≥ RT yields 1 −A1 , Pdκ2αdr =Prαrr & Pdαdw =Prαrw 
Λ= 
⎧ ⎪⎪⎨ ⎪⎪⎩ 
larly, using (4) and (5) for the case Cs Z ∞ 1 −A2 , Pdκ2αdr =Prαrr & Pdαdw =6 Prαrw 
1 −A3 , Pdκ2αdr =6 Prαrr & Pdαdw =Prαrw 
X (17)Λ = Pr τ (1 − δ) log2 < CT = FX (By)fY (y) dy,Y 1 
1 −A4 , Pdκ2αdr 6=Prαrr & Pdαdw 6=Prαrw(10) 
ˆ ˆ wherePsgsr Psgswwhere X = 1 + , Y = 1 + , B = 2CT/τ (1−δ).Q+r W +w ˜= A 
ih 
G (L, M, 2, 2) + 2P̂sαswG (L, M, 2, 3) , (18)A1 wEvidently, (10) can be derived with the aid of the CDF of 
X and the PDF of Y . Because X and Y share the same form, ^ 
we can start with deriving the PDF of Y . It is also noted A2 = [G (N, L, 1, 2) − G (M, L, 1, 2)] + 
that Y depends on W and hence, we frst derive the PDF of P̂sαsw [G (L, N, 2, 2) − G (L, M, 2, 2)] , 
W . By recalling that W is a sum of two independent random 
¯variables, its PDF is given by A3 = A [w 
A (w 
(19) 
{G (H, M, 1, 2) − G (I, M, 1, 2)} iZ
Z
(20)z 
+ 2P̂sαsw {G (H, M, 1, 3) − G (I, M, 1, 3)} ,fW (z) = (z − x) dxfPr grw (x) fPdgdw 
0 
_ 
− x − z−x z (11) A4 = A {w [G (H, N, 1, 1) − G (I, N, 1, 1)e Pr αrw e Pdαdw 
dx= −G (H, M, 1, 1) + G (I, M, 1, 1)]
0 Prαrw Pdαdw (21) 
which can be represented in closed-form as follows: + P̂sαsw [G (H, N, 1, 2) − G (H, M, 1, 2) 
− G (I, N, 1, 2) + G (I, M, 1, 2)]} , 
fW (z)= 
e Pr αrw −e 
⎧⎨ ⎩ 
− z 






(  − (B−1)r P̂sαsr αsw= ,  
, N 
R − (B−1)rexp−Pdκ2αdr )B ˆ
exp
P̂sgsw 
Pr Pdαrr αdr κB Pr αrwαsr 
FY (y) = EW P̂ 3 α2αsr1 + < y ¯ _ As sw= =W + w ,(Pr αrr Psαsr(13) 
P̂ 2 αsw αsr J − (B−1)r P̂s 1exp , H = 1 + αsr −ˆ BPss(y−1)(W +w ) ,− −Pdκ2αdr )B(Pr αrr Pr αrr B= EW αsrP̂sαsw1 − e y ≥ 1, 
Psαsr 1 Br wI = 1 + 
ˆ − , G = + ,Pdκ2αdr B B P̂s P̂sαsr αswR ∞whilst invoking (12) in (13), it follows that −Gx eG (a, b, u, v) = dx.(x+a)u(x+b)v 
that deriving
Z ∞ 0 It is a closed-form formulaapparent(y−1)(z+w )− 
P̂s αswFY (y)=1 − fW (z) dze for (17) needs the analytical evaluation of the inte-
0⎧ ⎪⎨ 
= ⎪⎩  
(y−1)w− gral in G. To this end, we frst let Q(a, b) = 
2 e P̂s αsw (14) R ∞ −Gye1 − Pq r , Pdαdw =Prαrw (y+a)b dy, which is expressed in closed-form as Q(a, b) = Pdαrw αdw 0, y ≥ 1(y−1)w− Pb−1
(b−1)! (−aG)k 
k=1 
P̂sαsw (−G)b−1 =Pr6 αrw (k−1)! −eaGEi(−aG) upon invoking [21, eq., Pdαdw1 − (m−q)e Pr αrw −Pdαdw  −1 (3.353.2)], with Ei(·) denoting the exponential integral. Based 
y−1 1where {q } = +m P̂sαsw 
Based on the above, the PDF of Y 
.Pdαdw on this and upon performing the partial fraction decompo-{ }Pr αrw P sition, the integral in u v
UgQ (a, u − g + 1) + Tj Q (b, v − j + 1) where Ug = 
g=1 j=1 
P G is represented as G (a, b, u, v) =can be readily deduced by taking the frst derivative of FY (y) w.r.t y, yielding (
=
which is valid for y ≥ 1, while R = PrPdP̂sαrwαdwαsw 
(y−1)w− ˆRe Psαsw q2(w + 2q) gQ−2 jQ−2, Pdαdw =Prαrw (−1)g−1 (v+n) (−1)j−1 
n=0 n=0 = =




(b−a)v+g−1 n! (a−b)u+j−1(15)−1 n!  stituting Λ in (17), Ξ in (8), and χ in (9) into (7), one obtains 
the exact closed-form formula of Φp.h i−1 
and J = (Prαrw − Pdαdw) P̂sαsw . 
Likewise, the corresponding CDF of X is computed simi- B. Unlicensed SOP 
⎧ ⎪⎨ 
larly to (14), yielding 
(x−1)r 
ˆb2 e Psαsr1− 
− 
, Pdκ
2αdr =Prαrrκ2 αdr 
Similar to Subsection III-A, the unlicensed SOP can be 
decomposed as  Čs ≥ RT Pr{Cs ≥ RT}Φs = Pr < CT < CT Cs Pr Pdαrr , x≥1FX (x) = (x−1)r− P̂sαsr ⎪⎩ Čs1− (c−b)e Pr αrr −Pdκ2 αdr (22), Pdκ2αdr =6 Prαrr Pr{Cs < RT}+ Pr Cs < RT 
(16) =  Ξ+ Ω(1 − Ξ) . 
5 
Substituting (3) and (6) when Cs ≥ RT into Čs and then 
inserting Čs into (22),   can be re-written explicitly as ( )
P̌sgsd1 + 
 = Pr (1 − τ) (1 − δ) log2 
U+d < CT . (23)
P̌sgsw1 + 
By comparing (23) 
evident that (23) can be 
the appropriate variable 
Λτ →1−τ, P̂s→P̌s,αsr →αsd ,Pr αrr →Pdαdd,Pdαdr →Pr αrd,r →d 
Similarly, substituting (3) and (6) for the scenario Cs < RT 
into Čs and then inserting Čs into (22), it readily follows that ( )
1 + Psgsd 
Ω = Pr (1 − δ) log2 
U+d < CT . (24)
1 + Ps gsw 
Again, comparing 
evident that (24) 
with the appropriate 
Λ
W +w 
with (10), it becomes 
derived from (10) with 
transformation:  = 
. 
ˆτ →1,Ps→Ps,αsr →αsd,Pr αrr →Pd αdd,Pdαdr →Pr αrd,r →d 
Hence, plugging the derived closed-form formulas for Ξ,  , 
and Ω into (22), yields a closed-form expression for Φs. 
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the proposed results 
have not been reported in the open technical literature. It is 
also noted that the derived expressions for Φs and Φp are 
useful for rapidly evaluating the security capability of both 
unlicensed and licensed communications in EHOCNwFD and 
in developing useful insights on the impact of the involved 
specifcations on the overall system behavior and performance. 
C. Asymptotic Analysis 
Letting Pr = ψPp and Pd = ζPp, the asymptotic anal-
ysis is carried out at high transmission power, i.e. Pp 
∞. When Pp → ∞, S correctly decodes P’s message. 
Therefore, the licensed SOP reduces to Λ̃ in (17) where  √ 2 
˜ αsw αsr αsr αsw 2X represents lim X; Ã1 = ω
2 
K,αdw αdr αrr αrw ψζκB Pp→∞  
3 ln( M̃/ ̃1 1 M̃−L̃ 2 L) ˜ ωαswK = + + − , M = ,
(M̃−L̃)
3 L̃ 2M̃2 M̃ M̃−L̃ ζαdw 
ωαsr 1 δθηαpsL = 1 + − , ω = ; =˜ ζκ2αdr B B τ (1−δ) Ã2 
ω3[W(Ñ)−W(M̃)] L̃−1+a 2 ln(a/L̃)αsr αsr −1 , W (a) = − ,αdwαdr αrr ψζ(κB)2(ψ αrw −ζ ) (a−L̃)2 (a−L̃)3 αsw αsw 
2ω3[H(H̃)−H(˜ωαsw αsw αsr I)]Ñ = ; Ã3 = , H (a) = ψαrw αdw αrw (ψ αrr −ζκ2 αdr )Bψζ  αsw αsw 
M/a)1 a−M̃ ln( ˜ 1 ωαsr− − , H̃ = 1+ − 1 , Ĩ = 
(a−M̃)
2 2M̃2 a−M̃ M̃ ψαrr B B 
ωαsr 1 H, 
˜ H, M̃)−L(˜ I, M̃)L( ̃ N)−L( ̃ I, Ñ)+L(˜
1 + ζκ2αdr B − B ; Ã4 = ω−2(ψ αrr −ζκ2 αdr )B(ψ αrw αdw ,−ζ )αsr αsr αsw αsw 
1 − ln(a/b)L (a, b) = . In order to obtain Λ̃, we assume: i) (a−b)b (a−b)2   
ˆ − (B−1)rPs → ωPp; ii) e−Gx → 1 in G(a, b); iii) exp P̂sαsr 
^ _ ^ _
˜ ¯ ¯1 in A, A, A, A; iv) ˜ A, A, A are inversely proportional A, 
to Pp; v) Ai → Ãi by keeping terms weighted by 
P̂s, i ∈ [1, 4]. Similarly, the unlicensed SOP reduces 
˜ ˜to  = Λτ→1−τ,ω→ω3,αsr →αsd,ψαrr →ζαdd,ζαdr →ψαrd,r →d 
δθηαpswhere ω3 = . Interestingly, by observing Ãi, we (1−τ )(1−δ) 
fnd that the licensed SOP Λ̃ (or the unlicensed SOP  ̃) is a 
function of fading power ratios of channels towards the same 
αsw αsw αsr αsr αsdreceiver, namely , , , (or αsd , ).αdw αrw αdr αrr αdd αrd 
W +w 
(24) with (10) renders 
can be derived from (10) 
change of variables: Ω = 
. 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
This section capitalizes on the derived analytic expressions 
along with results from respective computer simulations to 
quantify the achievable SOPs of both unlicensed and licensed 
communications for practical scenarios. All users are assumed 
to be placed on a two-dimensional plane and hence, the 
distance between user A at (xA, yA) and user B at (xB, yB) isq
2dAB = (xA − xB) + (yA − yB)2. Without loss of generality 
and unless otherwise stated, the following indicative fxed 
values are assumed as [4], [15]: θ = 0.7, β = 2.6, ς0 = −20 
dB, d =w =r =s = ̌s =−70 dBm, Pp = 60 dBm, Pr = 10 
dBm, Pd = 5 dBm, P at (−10, 0) m, S at (0, 0) m, D at 
(50, −20) m, W at (60, 0) m, R at (45, 15) m, CT = 0.1 bps/Hz, 
RT = 0.1 bps/Hz, αrr = αdd = −90 dB, κ = 0.1, K = 2, 
δ = 0.6, τ = 0.5, η = 0.7. To highlight the achievable security 
improvement of the proposed jamming method, EHOCN with 
HD destinations, namely EHOCNwHD, is compared with 
EHOCNwFD. This is straightforwardly realized by setting 
Pr = Pd = 0 in (7) and (22). 
Based on the above, Fig. 2 exhibits a perfect match be-
tween analytical and simulation results, which corroborates 
the validity of the proposed analytic formulas in (7) and (22). 
Moreover, it is clearly observed that EHOCNwFD outperforms 
EHOCNwHD, proving the achieved security enhancement of 
the jamming method. In the same context, Fig. 2a demonstrates 
that the best secrecy performance of both unlicensed and 
licensed communications in EHOCNwFD occurs at particular 
values of δ. The optimal values of δ that generate the minimum 
SOPs are explained as follows: enlarging δ increases energy 
scavenged at S in Phase 1 and offers higher probability for S 
to correctly restore the message of P, enhancing the security → 
performance of both unlicensed and licensed communications. 
Nevertheless, increasing δ decreases the transmission time of 
the last two phases, which deteriorates unlicensed and licensed 
secrecy capacities, and ultimately increases the corresponding 
SOPs. As such, the optimum values of δ exist to trade-off 
benefts in Phase 1 and in the last two phases. 
Fig. 2b demonstrates the achievable SOPs w.r.t η. This 
fgure shows that the achievable security performance of 
EHOCNwFD is improved as η increases. This stems from the 
fact that enlarging δ supports S in harvesting more energy 
in licensed signals, which in turn ultimately decreases Φp 
and Φs. Likewise, Fig. 2c illustrates the SOPs w.r.t τ , which 
reveals that enlarging τ enhances the security capability of the 
licensed communications and degrades that of the unlicensed 
communications in EHOCNwFD. This is interpreted from the 
fact that enlarging τ lingers Phase 2 but decreases Phase 3 for 
the unlicensed sender to relay the licensed message and then → 
send its own information. As a result, Φp reduces while, in 
turn, Φs increases. The opposite performance tendencies of the 
licensed and unlicensed networks represent the security trade-
off between them and hence, their security can be equalized. 
For example, Fig. 2c illustrates Φs = Φp at τ = 0.17. 
Finally, Fig. 2d illustrates the SOPs w.r.t Pp. This fgure 
considers Pr = Pd = 0.001Pp to verify the corresponding 
asymptotic analysis. Additionally, the SOPs are averaged over 
1000 positions of W where xW and yW are uniformly distributed 
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(a) SOPs w.r.t δ (b) SOPs w.r.t η (c) SOPs w.r.t τ (d) SOPs w.r.t Pp 
Fig. 2: Impact of adjusting the individual parameters. 
in [50, 70] m and [−10, 10] m, respectively, with (xW, yW) being 
the coordinate of W. This fgure demonstrates the considerable 
security enhancement of EHOCNwFD when increasing Pp. 
This occurs because enlarging Pp supports S in harvesting 
more energy in the licensed signal as well as aids S to exactly 
restore the message of P with a greater probability. This 
increases the channel capacities at the corresponding receivers 
in Phase 2 and Phase 3, which ultimately reduces the involved 
SOPs. Also, the asymptotic analysis matches the exact results 
at large Pp, validating the analysis in Subsection III-C. These 
results justify the usefulness of the proposed setup. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This work proposed EHOCNwFD for improved energy ef-
fciency and message security. In this context, we analyzed its 
licensed/unlicensed SOPs to quantify the achievable security 
and to develop useful insights on the effect of the involved 
specifcations on the overall system performance. Respective 
computer simulations also validated the proposed analysis. 
Moreover, various versatile results showed the superiority of 
EHOCNwFD to EHOCNwHD, the security trade-off between 
licensed and unlicensed communications, and the best security 
performance with appropriate selections of specifcations. The 
offered results are expected to be useful in the design and 
deployment of future cognitive radio systems and networks. 
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